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EROSION OF ADVANCED COUNTRY RENTS, INSURANCE, AND 
SYSTEM SOLVENCY 
As Soltwedel’s paper documents, the labor-market functioning of the 
West German economy has been weak by a number of measures: unemployment has 
been rising, the rate of growth of employment has slowed and the prospects 
for near-term improvement seem dim. Unemployment for 1987 is averaging 
close to 8 percent, even though capacity utilization is higher than in any 
of the last 27 years except 1979. (See Graph 1 in this paper.) Why has 
this happened? Was not Germany the advanced industrialized country (AIC) 
with the exemplary record of growth and low unemployment which was used as 
a benchmark by critics of United States labor-market performance? What 
happened to the unemployment rates of less than 2 percent which prevailed 
during- the 196Os? According to the paper, this sorry state of affairs is 
the consequence of a wide range of policy and institutional constraints on 
the market process which have given rise to wage rigidity and barriers to 
resource mobility. 
Soltwedel argues that the policy and institutional restrictions have 
given rise to the labor market problems, and that existing theories of the 
relation between unemployment and wage rigidity, such as the efficiency 
wage hypothesis, the implicit contract model, and even his somewhat 
preferred alternative, the “insider-outsider” approach, are weak reeds in 
the wind when compared to a more straightforward interpretation of 
goverrxaental and institutional failure. Since I agree with most of his 
main points, perhaps I was not a good choice as a discussant. Rather than 
ending here, I would like to provide a broader framework within which to 
interpret these failures and to look at additional evidence on the costs of 
market restrictions, some of which supports his general view and some of 
which does not. 
My main thesis is that much of what he documents as labor-market 
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intervention can be interpreted as a variety of social insurance mechanisms 
which have at least partly failed. Moral hazard costs and issues of 
solvency are accentuated by erosion of the economic rents or quasi-rents of 
high technology countries like West Germany. This erosion of rents has 
been brought about by emerging international competition. 
A. AN INSURANCE FRAMEWORK OF INTERVENTION AND INSTITUTIONS 
During the glory days of economic expansion in Germany, there was 
relatively little risk for displaced workers. A lost job arising from a 
demand or technological change could be quickly replaced. Similarly, in 
Sweden national labor-market policy could be centered on the idea that no 
one's job was guaranteed but that, via labor- market mobility, everyone 
could be guaranteed a job in an expanding economy. This seemed to work, 
but then as economic growth continued so, too, did the international 
division of labor. No longer were there a few select "industrialized 
countries" which had a dominant share of manufactured wealth, and, just as 
assumed in trade models, the basic manufacturing technology did become 
available to a wide array of competitors (i.e., the NICs). While the 
advanced industrialized countries were better off for the usual arguments 
about the gains to trade, they probably also lost, because their status as 
sole suppliers of goods based on advanced technological processes was 
challenged. This simultaneous process of international specialization and 
erosion of "advanced country quasi-rents" is not one which has proceeded 
smoothly. Cost advantages based on cumulative output or the "industrial 
learning curve" of industries in the established countries were surmounted 
by new entrants, and swings in exchange rates led to abrupt reversals of 
the roles of leader and follower. These patterns are exemplified by the 
United States position in television, semiconductors, autos, and earth- 
moving equipment. 
The recent experience of the advanced industrialized countries (AICs) 
is part of a more general consequence of specialization, which promotes 
economic growth but puts people in a situation of increased income risk. 
It is natural to ask what type of arrangement can be made either to reduce 
risks or to accommodate risks. Reducing risks could be accomplished by 
reducing the specialization of workers or having a larger share of economic 
activity in sectors with predictable demand. Accommodating risks could be 
accomplished by organizing a system of insurance against the increased risk 
of loss that specialization brings. If the former results in substantial 
reductions of output, it could be more efficient for society to choose a 
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strategy that encourages international specialization and accommodates the 
attendant risk through insurance. 1 We know from economic theory that 
insurance dominates another alternative, namely savings as a protection 
against loss. In a more general context Milton Friedman (1953) has argued 
that many arrangements among individuals in a society involve joint advance 
agreement for redistribution of the product obtained ex post. 
The theme which I wish to develop here is that much of the government 
policy in Germany and other industrialized countries with respect to their 
labor markets can be regarded as an effort to implement a network of social 
insurance. Indeed, Soltwedel hints at this in various places in his paper 
by reference to moral hazard problems. All of the government failures 
which he identifies can be thought of as the costs of policies designed 
with an insurance function in mind but with insufficient attention to the 
resource allocation costs arising from moral hazard problems. In terms of 
Varian's (1980) model of social insurance, the labor market policies have 
probably created a larger deadweight cost than they have created social 
insurance benefits, or at least alternative social insurance arrangements 
may have had a more favorable benefit-cost ratio. 
If we accept the hypothesis of declining rents or quasi-rents of the 
AICs, there is a fundamental problem for a social-insurance system even if 
there were no moral hazard problems: as noted by Wilson (1968) if 
correlated risk leads to insolvency there needs to be a sharing rule (such 
as proportional) in order to achieve budget balance. Most of the policy 
schemes set up by government do not have such provisions, and hence a 
smaller ex post economic pie than anticipated leads to pressures for 
deficits or other more costly forms of imagining that one can ignore the 
budget constraint. 
B. KINDS OF "INSURANCE" POLICIES 
What kinds of insurance schemes have been set up for the European 
AICs, including Germany? In Soltwedel's paper there are basically seven 
kinds of schemes which I would like to identify in addition to one of my 
own: 
1. Subsidies to firms to continue operation. The cost of these 
subsidies included the allocation cost of slowed redeployment of industry 
‘We know from econcmic theory that insurance dominates another alternative, namely, 
savings as a protection against loss. 
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and firm resources to new and more attractive lines of business. This 
prolonged structural unemployment as well as slowed real economic growth, 
accentuating the problem of solvency indicated above. In Table 9 Soltwedel 
documents the growth of subsidies over the period 1973-1984. 
2. Various types of payments to workers. These include mandatory 
severance payments (see Tables 12 and 13) and increased unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits (item 51). I believe that most European countries, 
including Germany, do not substantially experience a UI payroll tax imposed 
on employers as is true in the United States, hence, the "insurance" 
premiums are not adjusted for the number or extent of claims made. In 
addition there is social-aid payments (Table 15) and progressive income 
taxes (Tables 16 and 17). 
3. Wage leveling. This is accomplished by mandatory minimum wages 
(Tables 4 and 5). Here the allocation cost of the insurance policy is most 
obvious if we assume wage departures are a necessary condition to create 
the quasi-rents needed to motivate migration and retraining in the world of 
differentiated labor characterizing AICs. Wage "guarantees." which lead to 
unemployment are scarcely worth writing about as an insurance mechanism. 
Yet in a policy environment, if a seniority system identifies the layoff 
order, then these "insider" workers, presumably a majority, are insured. 
4. Compulsory collective bargaining. For those knowledgeable about 
the United States environment where collective bargaining is highly 
decentralized (except for a few outliers like autos and steel), it should 
be noted that in Europe collective bargains often cover a wide range of 
firms and industries. If these broad collective bargains call for 
moderation to restore an industry's wage level to one compatible with world 
prices and the exchange rate, this can have favorable effects (unless 
relative wages within the group need revision). In Soltwedel's account of 
the matter however, this appears not to have been the case for Germany, 
and there has been a growth of compulsory collective bargaining agreements 
(Table 3). 
5. Geographic and residential mobility. While not a direct policy 
measure, this falls into the general category of an institutional influence 
which provides a form of security or insurance. With restricted mobility 
plant closing and relocation decisions are more apt to engender political 
support to preserve the individual's housing location. See, for example, 
McKenzie (1984). 
6. Regulatory restrictions on dismissal. (See Table 11 and Graph 3.) 
Similar provisions were implemented in Sweden in 1974 and I will return to 
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this below. As Soltwedel notes, the cost of this "insurance policy" is an 
allocation cost which shows up in the form of reduced hires and reduced 
quits along with the intended benefit of a lower layoff rate. To use the 
popular term, these appear to be the restricted flows which are 
characterized as the "Eurosclerosis" of labor markets. 
7. Aggregate demand management. Here visible sectors which have 
erroneously overpriced their products or have failed to adopt new 
technology, as well as those which are truly in need of insurance, are all 
temporarily helped by an expansion in aggregate demand. Depending on one's 
brand of macroeconomics, this may simply create more inflation if there is 
no economic slack which can create "instant solvency" and restoration of 
wealth for those experiencing losses. 
8. Retraining. This is not discussed by Soltwedel, but I believe that 
West Germany has a relatively large program in this area. In principle 
such a program can serve both insurance and allocation functions 
favorably. The evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is not 
clear, and Johnson and Tomala (1977) have shown that the intent of the 
program can be subverted by “fiscal substitution” when it is run by local 
governments, and it may well be true that when run through the private 
sector there is fiscal substitution as well. 
What can be said of all these eight areas of intervention or 
institutional restriction on the labor market? To summarize, they can be 
thought of as driven by insurance motives but can easily run onto the 
shoals of moral hazard. The argument for compulsory insurance fami 1 i ar to 
economists, namely, adverse selection, may simply be overwhelmed by other 
problems such as solvency and incentives in the implementation of such 
programs. My point here is to at least offer an explanation of how a set 
of policies which look bad ex post may not have been brought forth only as 
the result of rent-seeking or folly. I would argue still further that a 
complete absence of some form of labor-market insurance would also be 
costly: workers in a wide range of skills have relatively little wealth not 
at risk and, absent some form of public or private insurance, may steer 
away from the sectors of the economy containing such risk. 
Countries which have no labor market insurance mechanisms will be 
revealed by analysts of trade flows as not having a *comparative advantage” 
in particular industries characterized by labor income risk. These 
industries, though, are typically the ones which we think of as subject to 
technological change and as having contributed greatly to the current 
position of the AICs. 
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6. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE ABOVE 
Here I would like to offer additional evidence on selected areas 
indicated above. These are facts about industrial subsidies in other 
European countries, data on labor-market flows before and after a policy of 
advance-layoff notification was implemented in Sweden in 1974, data on wage 
dispersion suggesting less compression in West Germany than indicated by 
Soltwedel, and a simple comparison of wage flexibility in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States. 
1. Industrial subsidies in Europe. Research by Carlsson (1983) shows 
that by 1980 4.0 percent of value added in mining and manufacturing in West 
Germany could be accounted for by a variety of subsidies such as export 
subsidies, R and D subsidies, employment subsidies, "rescue" subsidies and 
specific firm studies. Nor was Germany alone in this by any means. The 
corresponding figure for Great Britain was 3.6 percent, for Italy it was 
7.1 percent, and for Sweden it was 16.0 percent. These subsidies were also 
quite unevenly distributed so that particular firms and branches of 
industries were virtually dependent on government 'insurance" payments for 
their survival. 
2. Advance layoff notification in Sweden. As shown in Table 1, Sweden 
had a monthly layoff rate of .30--36 per hundred workers during the 1971-72 
recession. In 1974 a policy of advanced layoff notification was imple- 
mented. The intent of the policy was to attenuate the risk of labor-market 
displacement and adjustment costs. It was designed so that a layoff notice 
was required for employees who had been with the firm for six consecutive 
months or a total of 12 months during the last two years, and the duration 
of lead time varied from one month for employees under 25 years of age to 
six months if the employee was over 45.' 
During the next recession after the policy was implemented, 1976-1977, 
the policy appears to have worked: the layoff rate had declined to less 
than half of its value in the preceding recession, namely, to .12-.15. The 
cost of the policy was in the concomitant decline in the quit rate (down to 
1.80 and 1.51 from 1.86 and 2.09) and in the even sharper 
new hire rate (down to 1.30 and 1.87 from 2.29 and 2.46). 
3. German wage dispersion reported in other studies. 
Bell and Freeman (1985), wage dispersion increased modestly 
decline in the 
As reported in 
in West Germany 
2 
Swedish Laws on Security of Employment, Status of Shop Stewards and 
Disputes, Ministry of Labor, Stockholm, Sweden, May 1977, pp.ll-12. 
Mitigation of Labor 
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TABLE 1 
Monthly Layoff, Quit, and New Hire Rate per 100 Workers 
Swedish Mining and Manufacturing, 1970-1977 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Layoff -24 
Quit 2.92 
New Hire 3.47 
Recession 




layoff notice - 
-36 -30 -22 -16 -15 
2.09 1.86 1.94 2.20 1.95 
2.29 2.46 2.67 2.97 2.19 







Source: Layoff, quit and new hire rates are from the Central Statistical 
Bureau, unpublished data. 
'Source: Swedish Employment Policy, 1977-1978. National Labor Market Board, 
p.53. 
b Third and fourth quarters only. 
For more information see Studies in Labor Market Behavior:Sweden and the 
United States, (Gunnar Eliasson, Bertil Holmlund and Frank P. Stafford, 
eds.) Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, Stockholm, 
1981. 
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between 1975 and 1982 and went up in the United Kingdom as well. France, 
Spain, Italy, and Switzerland either experienced a reduction or no change 
in wage dispersion. Japan experienced an increase in wage dispersion, 
starting from a level above all the other countries in the comparison, and 
the United States was most strongly characterized by growing interindustry 
wage dispersion. In this context it could be argued that given the 
adjustments which should have taken place in West Germany, a still larger 
dispersion would have been helpful. However, I believe that Soltwedel’s 
examination of legislated or bargained minima may lead to an erroneous 
impression of what is happening to transaction wages. 
A doctoral student of mine at Michigan, Filip Abraham, has found that 
in Belgium manufacturing wage dispersion fell from 1965 to 1975 and rose 
moderately thereafter. His analysis shows a modest but steady rise in 
manufacturing wage dispersion over the period 1965-1980 for West Germany. 
Sweden, while having the lowest wage dispersion of any AIC, has still 
managed to attain reasonably strong economic growth. 
4. Compensation changes in Germany and other countries. Annual 
compensation changes in manufacturing for West Germany compared to those 
for Japan and the United States for the period 1970-1984 are presented in 
Table 2. The pattern shown in Table 2 is one in which both West Germany 
and Japan were experiencing rapid real compensation increases until the 
first oil shock. Subsequently, from 1975 on, Japan’s annual percentage 
increases have been lower and more variable, whereas those for Germany are 
persistently strong until the 198Os, and from then on are more moderate and 
variable. The United States compensation increases are more humble even 
during the 197Os, and are moderate and quite variable throughout the entire 
period. 
It could be argued that since 1981 West Germany has moved toward a 
more flexible compensation growth pattern as some of the insurance 
functions have given way to interest in long-term growth. That is, some of 
the concerns expressed in Soltwedel’s paper have been acted upon, and 
allocation issues have a larger play in labor-market policy and 
institutions. With moderation in compensation, one would expect a smaller 
excess supply of labor. On the other hand many of the side effects of 
insurance policies remain. The net return to market search, mobility, and 
employment are reduced. This is because of income payments, wage leveling, 
and other impediments indicated in this discussion. 
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TABLE 2 
Percent Annual Change in Real Hourly Manufacturing Compensation 
West Germany, Japan, and the United States, 1970-1984 
Year Ending Country 
















































Source: Economic Report of the President, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1987. Tables B-105, B-106, B-107. The 
compensation index was deflated by the CPI and for West Germany and Japan 
was converted back into domestic currency value. 
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